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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of metaphoric language on judgment, assessment
and juror verdict decision making. It further examines potential interactions between the
use of figurative language and defendant race on juror verdict decisions. Research has
potential implications on how the recent cultural climate has changed racial biases
within the realm of juror decision making.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The United States Jury is a powerful entity that makes collaborative decisions
regarding the fate of many involved in the American Justice System. The multiple citizen
jury is designed to produce a more precise and just judgment than a single judge. (Tindale
& Davis, 1983; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983). An abundance of literature
supports the concept of the citizen jury; such research shows that judgments made by
groups are more accurate and less biased than those made by individuals. (Tindale &
Kluwe, in press; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Devine, 2012; Stawiski, Dykema-Engblade, &
Tindale, 2012). This project investigates the biases jurors carry into deliberation and how
those biases can be influenced by certain types of language.
Racial biases are not a new concept to be studied in psychological literature.
Many researchers have attempted to examine how implicit associations regarding
particular prejudices affect behavior (Allport, 1954; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Ma & Correll,
2010). In recent years, racial prejudice looks a little different; the form of racism has
changed (Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder
& Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2003; Bothwell et al. 2006). Racism
in contemporary American society involves a disinclination among Caucasians to engage
in obvious acts of discrimination against African Americans. When discrimination
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against blacks occurs, whites attempt to justify it on grounds other than just race
(Bothwell et al. 2006). There is no apparent evidence of this phenomenon existing in the
reverse. This project furthers understanding of the biases engaged in verdict assignments
for individuals of African American and Caucasian descent when controlled for crime.
Another goal of this project was to examine the processes that underlie individual
juror’s verdict assignments considering the cognitive narrative that they possess as the
product of case presentation. Figurative language, specifically metaphoric in nature, is
instrumental in framing arguments and providing highly descriptive language which is, in
turn, persuasive. Metaphors are an effective communication strategy that creates less
verbose, yet more vivid and memorable statements. Research done by Grasser and
colleagues (1989) found that people use metaphors rather frequently: approximately once
every 25 words. Recently, metaphoric language has been used to further understand how
people represent crime in general (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). An example is the
colloquialisms used in politics, “war on drugs,” “get tough on crime” or “crime as a
disease.” Politicians use such phrases to describe crime and produce policies to address
related concerns.
There are a multitude of methods that have been used in literature regarding the
biases found in the decision making process of juries and individual jurors (Devine,
2012). The story model serves as a tool to reveal the cognitive processes that underlie the
computation of evidence and case presentations into a final verdict decision. The story
model allows jurors to recreate a cognitive narrative that can be studied. The idea is that
jurors choose a verdict that most closely aligns with their respective cognitive narrative.
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The deliberation of a jury then serves as an attempt to synthesize the cognitive narratives
of all jurors into a single narrative that allows the group to assign a befitting verdict
(Devine, 2012). Although not much empirical evidence can be found in the recent
research, the story model can be used to examine many of the biases that juries and
individual jurors possess. The present study uses the method of the story model, however,
we use a similar coding method.
Metaphor and Cognition
Metaphoric language consists of three basic components: the topic or subject of
the metaphor, the vehicle that the subject is being compared to, and the ground or implied
topic. (Grasser, Long & Mio, 1989). However, some literature breaks metaphoric
language down into two parts; the topic of the metaphor and the “vehicle.” The topic is
called the target or the specific subject of the metaphor. The “vehicle” or “source” is the
concept or object that the target is being likened to. (Lakoff, 1993; Richards, 1936; Ottati,
Renstrom, & Price, 2014).
The Metaphoric Framing model was constructed to describe the effects of
metaphoric language. The model has two fundamental components; the activation and the
application. The activation of the metaphor is the first stage where the metaphor
“activates,” this begins with priming of the vehicle. The activation is simply when the
vehicle or source is primed. The application is when the vehicle is applied and linked to
the target; for example, activating a stereotype (such as “disease”), to a specific subject
(such as “crime”). An example is the suggestion that a “criminal is a beast” or the
“officer is a bully.” These types of statements are descriptions of a “root metaphor.”
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Subsequent phrases may draw on the root metaphor. Many times, metaphors imply a
story or specific stereotype. For example, “bully” implies that there is a victim or target
of the ‘bullying.’ The root metaphor applies the ‘bully’ script to the target, the officer.
The second stage of the Metaphoric Framing Model is the application of the metaphor.
This step involves drawing upon the implications regarding the root metaphor. “Officer is
a bully” implies indirectly that the victim of such a bully needs to be rescued.
The linking of the target to the vehicle (application) can be done explicitly as
well; phrases may be added to go on to describe the officer using verbiage that links to
the stereotype, such as “[the officer] taunted the defendant” (Ottati, Renstrom, & Price,
2014). Incidental activation of the metaphor may occur when two schemas are presented
and the viewer/reader spontaneously links the two. For example, an individual watching
the news may view multiple breaking developments in a short amount of time. One story
might discuss the most recent terrorist attack, and the next news story may be about a
recent outbreak of E.coli. The metaphor, “terrorism is a disease” may be instantaneously
activated. Some metaphoric phrases are used so regularly that they become chronically
accessible and have automatic activation in the mind.
Current media regarding alleged police discrimination of African Americans
frequently uses metaphorically charged words and phrases such as “bully.” Such phrases
imply that the ‘bully’ must be stopped and that they are causing others to feel
uncomfortable or threatened in some way. Metaphoric phrases allow information to be
implied and other missing information may be “filled in” when there are holes in the
story (Ottati, Renstrom, & Price, 2014).
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In case presentation, jurors who are given this metaphoric and affectively charged
information are more likely to be persuaded into feelings that the “bully” must not win.
They are, therefore, more prone to feel sympathy for the “victim” defendant and find
him “not guilty.” A similar outcome is expected if a defendant is described as a “beast.”
Such a phrase implies that the defendant is a “wild animal” which must be tamed or
restrained in some way. The effect would presumably be most prevalent in cases where
jurors have little contrary evidence or little evidence at all. The effect would strongly
influence jurors who have been previously exposed to information that is consistent with
the metaphor (Hansen, 2007).
Thus far, research on figurative language has not been studied in conjunction with
individual jurors or deliberating juries. Because metaphors directly affect the mental
representation of biases, the use of metaphoric language is appropriate to use in my
examination of the development of biases that influence a particular verdict.
Race
Metaphor-Race Congruence hypothesis predicts that the metaphor assimilation
effectise especially strong when the defendant’s race is compatible with the metaphor.
That is, the “beast” or “animal” metaphor should elicit especially severe ratings of guilt
when the defendant is African American. This is because African Americans and
animals are stereotyped as possessing congruent attributes (e.g., dangerous, violent).
However, this assimilation effect is more likely to occur when there is a subtle
metaphoric prime. Assimilation is the process by which the viewer/reader accepts the
metaphoric content as true. Subjects may view explicit metaphoric primes as offensive
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and thus they may attempt to correct (maybe even overcorrect) for such—which is
referred to as a contrast effect (Ottati 2012).
The current state of the social and political climate is highly in tune with the topic
of police brutality. Recent events such as the State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson
regarding the shooting of Michael Brown highlights the current social sensitivity to the
idea that people (particularly African Americans) are subject to being victims of
“bullying” in the criminal justice system. The prevalence of news stories featuring a
black victim and a white police officer as a “bully” have occurred such high frequency
that the linkage of “police” and “bully” is chronically accessible to the public. Similarly,
there have been numerous instances where racism became a main topic of conversation in
the media and, consequently, trickled into the justice system. These recent events have
made salient the role of African Americans as victims of police bullying. This makes the
metaphor-congruence equally applicable for the “bullied” or “victim” metaphor for
African Americans in a legal setting. Aside from the political discord surrounding these
cases, the topic of racism is historically controversial in American culture.
Story Model
Pennington and Hastie (1986; 1993) were the first researchers to propose the use
of the Story Model in jury research. The goal of the model is to uncover the cognitive
processes that jurors use to synthesize the evidence presented and the case presentations
from both sides. Presumably, jurors is then proceed to choose a verdict that is most
congruent with their reported cognitive narrative (Devine, 2012).
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Jurors do not limit their interpretation of a case to strictly the information that is
presented. During the usual course of a jury trial, case presentation is broken up by
testimony and witness examination. Jurors are motivated to understand the case as much
as possible because they are reminded several times by attorneys and judges on the
importance of their role. As active information processors, they engage in an intensive
cognitive process as information is presented. Jurors rely on previous knowledge to fill
in gaps of missing information as consequence of the segmented nature of trial
presentation. The previous knowledge and experience that individual jurors bring into a
jury carry respective individual bias and prejudice. The story model relies on these
assumptions.
The hypothesis is that jurors are able to accurately recreate their cognitive process
in such a way that it reflects the actual information process they experienced while
interpreting the evidence of the case. Jurors then choose a verdict that is most aligned
with their cognitive “story.” Furthermore, the theory asserts that the better a story
matches the criteria for a specific verdict, the more confident that a juror feels in their
verdict decision.
The current research was interested in the juror’s recall of metaphoric statements
or innuendoes. Do jurors recall the metaphoric “vehicle?” Do jurors use any similar
words or phrases which may be metaphorically linked or similar to the vehicle used in the
story? If so, it would imply a strong effect of the metaphoric content. One general
question this research hoped to address is whether metaphoric language has an influential
impact on jury verdict assignments. Also, we were interested to find out whether or not
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this effect is influenced by the race of the defendant or of the individual jurors. Although
this study does not test the coherence of the story narrative, this can be explored in future
research on the effect of metaphoric language on the story model.

CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW
Research
Participants occupied the role of jurors who examined trial evidence in the form
of a trial transcript regarding an alleged carjacking. The defendant’s race was briefly
mentioned prior to the case presentation and it was randomly generated to be either
African American or Caucasian. Metaphoric content was also manipulated. In one
condition, statements were inserted into the defense’s trial presentation that implied the
defendant was the “victim of bullying” (officer bullying metaphor) while implying that
the system, or arresting officer, bullied him. In another condition, statements were
inserted into the prosecution's case that imply a “beast” (animal) metaphor to describe the
defendant. We investigated our hypotheses by presenting participants with two sets of
arguments; one set was the prosecution’s arguments and the other was the defense’s
arguments. We examined the effect of metaphoric utterances by (a) inserting or omitting
the “beast” metaphor into the prosecution argument, and (b) inserting or omitting the
“bully” metaphor into the defense argument.
Participants then wrote a short story describing what they thought happened in the
case. This was how we tested whether or not participants recalled the metaphoric content.
Participants were asked to give their verdict, “guilty” or “not guilty”, then to give a rating
of their confidence level on a scale of 1-10 (ten being most confident). We refer to this
9
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rating as the “Probability of guilt rating.” Subjects then rated the arguments of both the
prosecution and the defense for “effectiveness.” We predicted that participants would
recreate metaphoric content in their case narrative more often when they gave a higher
confidence rating in their verdict.
Hypothesis
Our central hypothesis predicted an effect of metaphoric language on verdict
assignment and confidence in that verdict. We predicted a greater amount of guilt in the
“metaphor in prosecution argument” (“beast”) condition and a greater amount of “not
guilty” verdicts in the “metaphors in defense argument” (“bully”) condition. We expected
a higher number of “guilty” verdicts in conditions where the “beast” metaphor was used
to describe a black defendant. However, we expected some participants to correct for the
bias this metaphoric content presented. Consequently, we predicted a higher rate of “not
guilty” verdicts in conditions where the bully metaphor was used in accordance with a
black defendant.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODS
Participation
The surveys were taken online by introductory psychology students who received
course credit for their participation. We collected responses from 194 subjects.
Participants mean age was 19 years. The population we used consisted of 29% males and
71% females. The sample contained 52.5% of participants who identified as Caucasian,
and 3% who identified as African American. The second largest (16.5%) racial group
identified as Asian.
Design
The present study was designed as a 2 (defendant race) by 2 (presence or absence
of pro-prosecution metaphor (“beast” metaphor) or pro-defense metaphor (“officer was a
bully”)) by 2 (presence or absence of a defense metaphor (“bully metaphor”))
experiment.
Participants were recruited through an online recruiting system where
participants were able to select which cases they participate in. Participants who selected
the “Juror decision making” study were told they would read a hypothetical case about a
carjacking. The entire study was conducted online and participants were awarded one
point of class credit for completing the study.
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The case was written in the format of a case transcript that mimics what attorneys
might actually say during a trial regarding a carjacking. Both defense and prosecution
stories were written as to provide a coherent story, but it should be unclear which verdict
is most appropriate given the facts. The facts of the case remain constant among all
conditions. Metaphoric content was added to the prosecution or defenses case in order to
bolster the arguments of each side.
There were four content conditions; no metaphoric language, metaphoric
language in only the prosecution’s case (the “beast” metaphor), metaphoric language in
only the defense’s case (the “bully” metaphor), and metaphoric language in both the
prosecution and defense arguments. Race was randomly generated in each case for a total
of eight conditions.
The officer and the other characters in the case had racially neutral names (neither
black nor white. i.e. Rogers, Tabor and Worthy) to disassociate them with traditional
racial stereotypes. The control conditions had either both metaphors or no metaphorical
content.
We predicted the manipulation of metaphoric language in case presentation and
the defendant race manipulation would cause an effect on juror judgments of case
presentation (found in the story model), verdict assignments, reported probability of guilt,
and recreation of metaphoric words or phrases.
Materials
This study was conducted using an online survey method. The survey was created
on Qualtrics, an online survey software. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
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eight conditions. All participants read a trial transcript describing a carjacking case (see
appendix). The prosecution claims the defendant hit the victim in a parking garage in
order to take his car. The defense claims the defendant was never in the parking garage,
but was incidentally driving the car that was stolen by another person.
Some participants received metaphoric content in the defense’s case, some in the
prosecution’s case, some in both the prosecution’s and defense’s cases (control), and
some in neither case (control). Defendant race was randomly assigned within conditions.
Conditions were randomly assigned by the survey software and the software ensured that
each condition would have close to the same number of participants.
To create the “bully” metaphor conditions, statements were inserted into the
defense’s presentation that imply or directly state “the defendant is a victim of police
bullying” or discrimination. Such techniques have been used successfully in past
research regarding blatant metaphoric influence (Ottati, Graesser, & Rhoads, 1999;
Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). The “beast” condition consisted of statements that
allude to animalistic behaviors (e.g. preyed, pounced, fixated, grizzly). Importantly, the
inserted metaphoric statements provided no additional evidence to the case, they were
simply presented as opinion statements by each respective side of the case (see
appendix).
The content and length of the trial summaries were similar regardless of
condition. Metaphoric statements used all had explicitly stated metaphors. Although a
more subtle infusion of the root metaphor may be explored in future experiments, we
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were interested if we could elicit effects with an explicitly stated metaphor (i.e. “the
defendant is a beast!”)
Procedure
Participants read a trial transcript that was fairly typical for a trial regarding
carjacking. For the sake of time, participants did not read any direct testimony or witness
examination. Instead, jurors read the case as if it were presented by both the prosecution
and defense attorneys. Participants read one of four trial transcripts as randomly
generated by the survey software. One had metaphoric phrases (containing the “bully”
metaphor) inserted into the Defense’s argument. An example of a metaphoric phrase in
the defense’s case was “The confession was brutally coerced” which was replaced with
“The confession was not legitimate” in the neutral conditions. The second condition had
metaphoric phrases (containing the “beast” metaphor) inserted into the Prosecution’s
argument. An example of a metaphoric phrase in the prosecution’s case was “This is a
beastly crime” which was replaced with “This is a serious crime” in the neutral
conditions.
One control condition had the metaphoric phrases inserted into both arguments,
and the other control condition had no metaphoric content (all neutral statements). Race
of the defendant was randomly manipulated (50% generate African American, 50%
generate Caucasian) within each condition. This created eight conditions in total.
Metaphoric content and race of the defendant served as the independent variables.
Following the case transcript, participants were asked to select a verdict that they
felt was appropriate (Guilty/Not Guilty). They were then asked to rate on a scale of one
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to ten how confident they felt the verdict they selected was true. The dependent variable
of verdict (coded -1 for guilty and +1 for not guilty) multiplied by confidence rating (110) created our “likelihood of guilt” variable. This coded value multiplied by the
confidence rating created an overall “probability of guilt” variable.
After reading the trial transcript, participants were asked to write a short narrative
about what they believed actually happened in the scenario. This format was used to see
whether or not subjects remembered and regenerated the metaphoric phrases. This was
coded dichotomously; a 0 if there were no metaphoric phrases included, and a 1 if there
was a metaphoric phrase used. A single research assistant coded all of the narratives
using the following guidelines: Use of words for the “victim,” “bullied,”
“forced/coerced,” “bribed,” “target(ed),” “brutality,” “aggressive/vicious,” “bludgeoned,”
“reckless,” or words synonymous to any of the above were coded ‘1’. Very neutral
words, use of more hypotheticals “if” “allegedly” rather than definitive terms “stole,”
“hit,” “confessed” “claims,” “accused,” etc., were coded ‘0’ for no metaphors used.
Participants also were asked to rate the strength of the argument presented by the
prosecution and the defense (see appendix). The quality scale was scored from 1-7 (with
7 being an “extremely effective argument”). Subjects were asked to recall the race of the
defendant from a list of several different races—this was our manipulation check to make
sure they indeed read the survey. Those who answered incorrectly were omitted from the
survey. Also, participants who wrote nonsensical or irrelevant stories were also omitted
from analysis.
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The case and specific evidence for and against the defendant were held constant
while the presence or absence of the metaphors were manipulated. Because the current
cultural climate in the U.S. semantically links both the “beast” and the “[victim of] bully”
metaphors to African Americans, we expected that conditions with this metaphoric
content would be more likely to produce verdicts which correspond with the metaphoric
content (more guilty verdicts when the prosecution contains the “beast” metaphor and
more ‘not guilty’ verdicts in when the defense argument contains the “[victim of]
bullying” metaphor) when there was a black defendant as opposed to a white defendant.
We expected to see more “guilty” verdicts in the “beast” condition overall, especially
when the defendant was black.

CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
Overall, 45.9% of all participants (N=194) chose a not guilty verdict for the
defendant in this case, while 54.1% chose a guilty verdict for the defendant regardless of
race. The percentage of participants who used some sort of metaphoric language when
writing their version of what happened in the case was 28.8%. The overall mean
likelihood of guilt, which was calculated by multiplying the verdict by the level of
confidence, across all conditions was (M=1.149, SD=6.704. This was slightly in the
guilty direction, but was very close to zero, which would be indicative of a fairly equal
distribution of guilt vs. not guilty ratings multiplied by confidence scores.
A 2 (prosecutor metaphors) x 2 (defense metaphors) x 2 (defendant's race)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated on several dependent variables, including
likelihood of guilt, verdict, quality of defense, quality of prosecution, metaphor code, and
confidence. The results of all ANOVAs are listed in Appendix C.
Contrary to our central hypothesis which predicted an effect of metaphoric
language on verdict assignment and confidence in that verdict, we did not get a
significant main effect for likelihood of guilt for the presence/absence of defense
metaphors F= (1, 186) =2.361, p=0.126, or prosecutor metaphors F= (1, 186) =0.123,
p=0.726. In addition, none of the higher order interactions were statistically significant.
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We also did not find a significant main effects of prosecution metaphor presence
on verdict judgments, F= (1, 186) =0.426, p=0.515. However, the main effect for the
defense metaphors produced a marginally significant difference, F= (1, 186) =3.047,
p=0.083. Overall, there were 51.5% ‘not guilty’ verdicts given for conditions that had the
defense metaphors present, while there were 40.0% ‘not guilty’ verdicts given for
conditions thatdid not have the defense metaphors present. Again, none of the higher
order interactions were statistically significant.
The results for the analyses of variance for Confidence and Quality of Prosecution
Arguments showed no significant main effects or interactions. This suggests the
prosecution argument was not particularly influential by itself, or perhaps jurors did not
notice the metaphors, or they were not pervasive.
However, in regard to ratings of the quality of defense argument, the analysis of
variance results showed a marginally significant main effect for use of defense metaphor
(F(1, 186) =3.792, p=0.053, and a significant 3-way interaction, F= (1, 186) =6.593,
p=0.011. Participants rated the quality of the defense arguments higher when the bully
metaphor was present (M=4.677, SD=1.49), as opposed to when it was absent (M=4.305,
SD=1.488). Table 1 reports the means for the eight conditions on quality of defense
arguments. To explore the three-way interaction, we ran t-tests comparing the presence
vs. absence of the defense metaphor in all four of the experimental conditions defined by
the other independent variables. We found a significant effect for defense metaphor
when the defendant was black and the prosecution also used their metaphor (beast),
t(194)= -4.31, p=.000 (see table 2). Participants saw the quality of the defense as

Prosecutor Metaphors
Dependent Variable

Defense Metaphors

Defendant Race

Overall
Mean/SD

Mean/SD

No Beast

Beast

No Bully

N=95

N=99

N=95

1.18/6.68

1.11/6.75

1.78/6.55

Mean/SD
Bully

Black

White

N=99

N=97

N=97

0.53/6.81

0.25/6.70

2.05/6.63

Not
Guilty=50.5%,
Guilty=49.5%

Not
Guilty=41.2%,
Guilty=58.8%

4.41/1.50

4.58/1.50

N=194

Likelihood of guilt

1.15/6.70

Verdict

Not
Guilty=45.9%,
Guilty=54.1%

Quality of Defense

4.50/1.50

4.43/1.50

4.55/1.49

4.30/1.48

Quality of
Prosecution

4.92/1.35

4.82/1.44

5.01/1.25

4.92/1.35

4.90/1.35

4.83/1.40

5.01/1.30

0.25/0.43

0.35/0.48

0.37/0.49

0.24/.430

6.50/1.86

6.49/2.03

6.40/1.90

6.61/2.00

Not
Not
Guilty=44.2%, Guilty=47.5%,
Guilty=55.8% Guilty=52.5%

Use of Metaphor in
story model

0.30/0.46

0.28/0.45

Confidence

6.50/1.95

6.49/1.88

0.32/0.47

6.50/2.02

Not
Guilty=40.0%,
Guilty=60.0%

Not
Guilty=51.5%,
Guilty=50.5%

4.67/1.49

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
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significantly higher when they used the metaphoric language. However, the effects of the
defense metaphor failed to reach significance in any of the other three conditions (See
appendix D for t values, etc.).
Ratings of the Quality of Defense's Argument
Mean/SD
Prosecution Metaphors

No Prosecution Metaphors

Race of Defendant

Black

White

Black

White

Defense Metaphors

5.45/1.00

4.52/1.55

4.36/1.50

4.68/1.67

No Defense Metaphors

3.77/1.50

4.73/1.34

4.31/1.49

4.44/1.47

Table 2. Significant 3-way interaction means and standard deviations.
Finally, the stories produced by the participants were coded for metaphor content
(mentions of bully, beast, or related terms). Surprisingly, there were no significant result
suggesting that using metaphoric language to create the stories was not influenced by the
metaphoric content presented in the case material.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
Our criminal justice system relies on the citizen jury to fulfill the role of “triers of
facts” (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Thus, they should come to the same
conclusion based on those facts regardless of how those facts are presented. However,
there is now a fair amount of evidence that linguistic tools, such as metaphors, can
change how people interpret other related information (Ottati, 2010). Our main
hypothesis was that there would be an effect of metaphoric language on juror verdicts and
their associated level of confidence in those verdicts. However, our results failed to
support this hypothesis, indicating that perhaps explicit metaphoric language does not
have a strong influence on juror verdict decisions, confidence in verdict decisions or
metaphoric recall or generation. Participants tended to choose the same verdicts
regardless of whether the defense or the prosecution added metaphors to their case. We
found a marginally significant difference between condiditons with and without the use
of metaphors. This would indicate that the [victim of] “bullying” metaphor was more
pervasive than the “beast” metaphor. This is perhaps due to the fact that this comparison
has been discussed more frequently in the media as of lately. Jurors, at least in our sample
population, are potentially more likely to sympathasize with the defendant and likely to
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accept the suggestion that the defendant was ‘bullied’ by the arresting officer or the
criminal justice system.
Metaphoric language does appear to be important for participants’ ratings of the
quality of defense argument, where a higher quality of defense was associated with using
bullying metaphors, compared to when no metaphors were used. The only significant
interaction we found occurred for ratings of the quality of defense argument. This,
however, only occurred in instances where both the “beast” and “bully” metaphors were
used in the case. Further, this effect only occurred when the defendant was black. We
found this effect did not occur for white defendants. In other words, participants were not
significantly influenced by the metaphor in a way that it altered their ratings of the white
defendant. This was the only race effect that was observed and it was only significant for
black defendants. We hypothesized that the use of metaphoric language would result in a
higher probability of guilt for African American individuals, specifically when the
"beast" metaphor is used, but the probability of guilt did not appear to be influenced by
defendant race. Finally, there was no evidence in our results suggesting that metaphoric
recall was influenced by whether or not there was metaphoric content.
We based our argument of the importance of metaphoric language on previous
research indicating that some metaphoric phrases are used so regularly that they become
chronically accessible and have automatic activation in the mind (Ottati, Renstrom, &
Price, 2014). So once activated, they might have the potential to influence verdicts. We
also based our argument on the fact that race bias could influence verdict assignment, as
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it has been shown in previous studies that strong racial biases do indeed exist (Bothwell
et al. 2006).
One reason for our finding could be the possibility that the use of metaphors does
not have the effect we hypothesized. Previous research indicated that both defense and
prosecution should be careful in regards to "toying" with a jury's emotions, because that
is something that they cannot control or predict (Feigenson & Park, 2006). Similarly, not
everyone would see the metaphors the same way. If a jury member has been bullied in
the past, he or she might see it as a negative metaphor, evoking negative schemata.
Evidence suggests the metaphoric phrases were not impactful when there was a
white defendant, however, it seems they were slightly effective with a black defendant,
but only in the evaluation of the defense’s argument when the “beast” and “bully”
metaphor were both present.
Perhaps, in future studies, varied levels of metaphoric language could be explored
also, we may want to access different and perhaps varied types of metaphors. The case
used in this research was relatively short in order to mind completion rates. We used the
metaphors multiple times within this short story, which may have alerted participants and
they may have attempted to counter its effects. It might be interesting to investigate more
subtle forms of metaphor over a longer case. More realistic cases would be much longer
and have more information to process. This could divert attention away from the
metaphors and they may prove to be more pervasive. Previous research suggests that
blatant use of metaphor can be rejected and compensated for. It would be interesting to
repeat this study with subtler use of the metaphors.
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Further, we did not find any evidence of the importance of the story model, once
again indicating that metaphoric language might not have as strong an impact on jurors’
cognitive narrative (Devine, 2012) as we initially thought. Our most interesting finding
was that the use of metaphors was associated with better quality of defense, which
supports previous research indicating that the way language is used in court could shape
the perception of the defense's performance.
We did not find significant effects of race, which might indicate the jurors might
have been aware of the potential racial bias and tried to minimize it, especially because
the majority of study participants were white. Curiously, we found some significant
interactions for the quality of defense and use of metaphors, but only for the white
defendants. These results could be due to the predominantly white participant pool.
Based on the results of this experiment, it appears the jurors still acted as triers of fact,
but were influenced by the metaphors when asked about the strength of argument.

APPENDIX A
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT
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Car Jacking Story
Bold statements are inserted into the metaphoric conditions, italicized statements
are inserted as equivalent neutral statements in conditions without metaphors. In
cases where there is no italicized phrase following a bold phrase, the bold
statement are omitted in neutral conditions.
Prosecution: Your Honor and ladies and gentlemen of the jury; the defendant has been
charged with the crime of Carjacking – using a firearm to steal, through force, violence,
or intimidation, a motor vehicle. P.T. Rogers. Mr. Rogers had started his 2004 Cadillac
Escalade in a parking garage in Murray, Kentucky, on the morning of April 6th, when
Jack Williams approached him wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. Mr. Williams held a
gun to Mr. Rogers head and Mr. Williams told him to step out of the vehicle. After
complying, Jack Williams then bludgeoned Mr. Rogers with the gun. Mr. Rogers was
then struck over the head with the gun. Jack Williams then jumped into the car and drove
away. Mr. Rogers reported the incident. Additional evidence showed that Jack Williams
was arrested in Ellsworth, Kansas for speeding while driving a 2004 Cadillac Escalade;
bearing the same vehicle identification number as the one reported stolen in Murray,
Kentucky. Jack Williams preyed upon Mr. Rogers in a time of vulnerability. This is a
beastly crime this is a serious crime and the evidence I present is prove to you that the
defendant is guilty as charged.

Defense: Your Honor and ladies and gentlemen of the jury; under the law my client is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. During this trial, you is hear no valid evidence
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against my client implicating him in the crime of Carjacking or any crime at all. You is
come to know the truth: that Jack Williams was driving a car that was stolen by someone
else. After finding out that the car was stolen, Jack Williams was just trying to do the
right thing by returning the car to its owner, whom he presumed was the girlfriend of his
friend. He was not the perpetrator of this crime. He was simply targeted by a corrupt
and biased system and then bullied into a confession by his arresting officer – an
official of the same biased and corrupt system. The confession that the prosecution is
claim incriminates my client, was not legitimate and was coerced. Therefore my client is
not guilty.

Prosecution: The defendant, Mr. Williams, was in the same parking garage on April 6th.
Footage from the parking garage cameras show Mr. Williams on the first floor of the
garage five hours before he pulled a gun on Mr. Rogers. After sizing up all of the cars in
the parking garage, he fixated on the 2004 Cadillac Escalade. , he chose the 2004
Cadillac Escalade. He waited until Mr. Rogers started the vehicle and then he attacked.
Mr. Williams chose the 2004 Cadillac Escalade. Once Mr. Rogers started his vehicle, he
saw the opportunity to threaten him. Mr. Rogers reported the incident and the car was
marked as stolen. The next day, Williams was pulled over driving aggressively in
Ellsworth, Kansas for speeding. After a routine check, it was learned that the car had
been reported stolen from Murray, Kentucky. Williams was then arrested.
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Defense: Mr. Williams was not at the parking garage on April 6th, the day the
prosecution claims the vehicle was stolen. The surveillance footage was very blurry and
the prosecution is assuming that Mr. Williams was at the scene. The crime occurred on
the 5th floor of the parking garage 5 hours after Mr. Rogers was supposedly spotted at the
garage. The perpetrator of this crime was reported to be wearing a hooded sweatshirt.
There is no way to identify my client as the perpetrator. That surveillance tape shows a
figure that could be anyone. Mr. Williams first saw the vehicle when a friend of his, Mr.
L.L. Worthy, came to his residence in Murray, Kentucky. He told Mr. Williams that the
car belonged to his (Worthy’s) girlfriend. Worthy asked Williams to accompany him to
Colorado so that he (Worthy) could look for a job, which Williams agreed to do. The two
went to Colorado together. Once arriving in Colorado, Mr. Worthy asked Mr. Williams to
take the car back to his girlfriend in Kentucky. Williams agreed to help his friend. He was
in a hurry to get back to Kentucky to visit his sick mother, so he was driving quickly
when he was targeted in a speed trap. He pulled over and was arrested. , so he was
driving quickly when he was pulled over and arrested. Williams had, at this time, no
reason to believe that the car was stolen since he assumed that the car belonged to
Worthy’s girlfriend and that Worthy had permission to drive it.

Prosecution: Officer Tabor, the arresting officer, identified Williams as the driver of the
stolen Escalade and he says that Williams never mentioned anything about the car
belonging to the girlfriend of Mr. Worthy. Mr. Rogers later identified Jack Williams
as the grizzly man who had attacked him in the parking garage in his car on the
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morning in question. Mr. Rogers identified Jack Williams as the man who had stolen the
vehicle from the parking garage on the morning in question.

Defense: Under cross-examination, Mr. Rogers, who had admitted to being very frazzled
due to the incident could not make a positive identification of Mr. Williams being the one
who drove the car out of the parking lot.

Prosecution: Mr. Williams confessed to being in the parking garage on April 6th after his
arrest.

Defense: My client is the victim of police brutality! My client confessed due to
pressure during the interview. The confession was brutally coerced. The confession
was not legitimate. The police falsely claimed to have incriminating evidence and they
promised Mr. Williams a lesser sentence if he confessed. They informed my client that
the maximum penalty for Carjacking was life imprisonment and if he confessed he
would at most get a year or two in jail. They told my client that confessing would be
the best approach for mercy from the court. The police bullied Mr. Williams to
intimidate him and force him to confess. The police said that the parking garage
surveillance was clearly incriminating, my client had no choice but to comply with the
authorities. The confession should be removed from the evidence.
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Prosecution: Even if that were true, the evidence still clearly demonstrates Mr.
Williams’s guilt. He preyed upon Mr. Rogers and took the Cadillac Escalade.
Furthermore, a Mr. L.L. Worthy could not be located in Colorado at the address at which
Mr. Williams claimed to have dropped him off.

Defense: It was confirmed that there was a Mr. L.L. Worthy living in Kentucky and,
according to phone records, him and Mr. Williams had a phone conversation on the
morning of April 6th. Mr. Worthy could have left the address where he was dropped off.
That is not clear evidence.

Prosecution: True, but Mr. Worthy’s girlfriend claims that her and Mr. Worthy have
recently split up and that she has not seen him since. Therefore, it would not make sense
that the car is hers.

Jury Instructions:
To prove the crime charged against the defendant, the prosecution must prove five things
to you:
1) The defendant stole a motor vehicle from the owner or current occupant;
2) The vehicle was taken from the immediate presence of a person who possessed
the vehicle or was its passenger
3) The vehicle was taken against that person's is with the use of a firearm;
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4) The defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle or to prevent that person
from resisting;
5) When the defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle, (he/she) intended to
deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle either temporarily or
permanently.
If each of you believes that the prosecution proved all five of these things beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. But if you believe the
prosecution did not prove any one of these things beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant not guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean
beyond all possible doubt. It means that you must consider all of the evidence and that
you are very sure that the charge is true.

Prosecution: The judge has told you that we must prove five things. There is absolutely
no doubt about these 5 things. First, the defendant was arrested driving a car belonging to
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Williams took the vehicle after Mr. Rogers started his vehicle in the
parking garage. The car was forced away from Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers was assaulted by
Mr. Williams and brutally attacked for his vehicle. Mr. Rogers was held at gunpoint
and ruthlessly battered by Jack Williams. Mr. Rogers was threatened with a gun and
struck over the head with the gun, so force was clearly used to take the vehicle from Mr.
Roger’s possession. Mr. Williams clearly had malicious and predatory intent to take
a vehicle which was not his. According to what the judge just told you, that is all we
have to prove. Based on the evidence, you must find the defendant guilty.
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Defense: Mr. Williams was unlucky to get into a car with a man who had stolen that car.
He got into the car because he had agreed to help his friend find a job in Colorado. If he
had knowingly gotten into a stolen vehicle, this would be a different case. Mr. William’s
confession was not legitimate and should not be considered in your deliberation. This
man is a victim of bullying in interrogation by corrupt police officers. Remember
that under the law my client is presumed to be innocent. The prosecution must prove
every part of its case beyond a reasonable doubt – that means that you must be very sure
that there is no possible circumstance beyond what the prosecution is describing. Mr.
Williams is a victim of a corrupted criminal justice system. Mr. Williams is not the
perpetrator in this case. One of the things they must prove is that my client is the one
who drove the car out of the parking garage. The prosecution has presented no real
evidence to you to show that this is true. That means that there is a reasonable doubt and,
therefore, you must find Mr. Williams not guilty.

APPENDIX B
RESEARCH SURVEY

33

34
Q1. Please describe what you think happened in the case outlined on the previous page.
Please include important facts and description of the defendant.

Q2. Please indicate which verdict you would choose for the defendant.
❏

Guilty (1)

❏

Not Guilty (2)

Q3. How confident are you that your verdict decision is true?
Not

2

3

4

Moderate

6

7

8

9

Very

Confide

(2)

(3)

(4)

ly

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Confide

Confiden

n t (1)

n t (10)

t (5)
Confiden

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

c e (1)

Q4. Please indicate how difficult you felt it was to make your verdict decision.
Very

Difficult

Somewhat

Neutral

Somewhat

Easy

Very

35
Difficult

(2)

Difficult

(1)

Easy (5)

(6)

(3)

❏

Difficulty

(4)

❏

Easy
(7)

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

(1)

Q5. Please rate your overall assessment of the Prosecution's case.
Neither
Very

Somewhat

Effective

Somewhat

Ineffective
Ineffectiv

Ineffective

nor

Effective

(2)
e (1)

Very
Effective
Effective
(6)

(3)

Ineffective

(5)

(7)

(4)

Quality
(1)

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏

❏
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Q6. Please rate your overall assessment of the Defense's case.
Very

Ineffecti

Ineffecti

ve (2)

ve (1)

Quali

❏

❏

Somewh

Neither

Somewh

Effecti

Very

at

Effectiv

at

ve

Effecti

Ineffecti

e nor

Effectiv

(6)

ve (7)

ve (3)

Ineffecti

e (5)

❏

ty

Q7. What was the race of the Defendant?
❏

Caucasian (1)

❏

African American (2)

❏

Hispanic (3)

❏

Asian (4)

❏

Indian (5)

❏

Multiple/Mixed Race (6)

Q8. Please indicate your sex.
❏

Male (1)

❏

Female (2)

ve (4)
❏

❏

❏

❏
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Q9. Please indicate your age.

Q10. Please indicate your race.
❏

Caucasian (1)

❏

African American (2)

❏

Hispanic (3)

❏

Asian (4)

❏

Indian (5)

❏ Multiple/Mixed Race (6)

APPENDIX C
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable:

liklihoodGuilt
Type III Sum of
Squares
418.222a
228.420

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

df
7
1

Mean
Square
59.746
228.420

F
1.346
5.146

Sig.
.231
.024

ProsecutionMetaphors

5.472

1

5.472

.123

.726

DefenseMetaphors

104.785

1

104.785

2.361

.126

DefendantRaceCondition

164.654

1

164.654

3.709

.056

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors

13.950

1

13.950

.314

.576

112.818

1

112.818

2.542

.113

54.093

1

54.093

1.219

.271

.967

1

.967

.022

.883

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition
Error
Total
Corrected Total

8256.443
186
44.389
8931.000
194
8674.665
193
a. R Squared = .048 (Adjusted R Squared = .012)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable:
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

QualityDefense
Type III Sum of
Squares
35.261a
3881.548

df
7
1

Mean
Square
5.037
3881.548

F
2.347
1808.383

Sig.
.026
.000

ProsecutionMetaphors

1.303

1

1.303

.607

.437

DefenseMetaphors

8.140

1

8.140

3.792

.053

DefendantRaceCondition

.664

1

.664

.310

.579

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors

4.827

1

4.827

2.249

.135

.536

1

.536

.250

.618

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition
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DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition
Error
Total
Corrected Total

7.505

1

7.505

3.496

.063

14.151

1

14.151

6.593

.011

399.234
186
2.146
4354.000
194
434.495
193
a. R Squared = .081 (Adjusted R Squared = .047)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable:

Metaphor Code
Type III Sum of
Squares
1.869a
17.532

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

df
7
1

Mean
Square
.267
17.532

F
1.267
83.213

Sig.
.269
.000

ProsecutionMetaphors

.097

1

.097

.461

.498

DefenseMetaphors

.479

1

.479

2.274

.133

DefendantRaceCondition

.796

1

.796

3.778

.053

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors

.199

1

.199

.947

.332

.069

1

.069

.328

.567

.032

1

.032

.151

.698

.092

1

.092

.436

.510

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Dependent Variable:
Source

39.188
186
.211
59.000
194
41.057
193
a. R Squared = .046 (Adjusted R Squared = .010)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Verdict
Type III Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.
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Corrected Model
Intercept
ProsecutionMetaphors
DefenseMetaphors
DefendantRaceCondition
ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors
ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

a

7.738
1.261

7
1

1.105
1.261

1.112
1.268

.357
.262

.424

1

.424

.426

.515

3.030

1

3.030

3.047

.083

2.000

1

2.000

2.012

.158

.665

1

.665

.668

.415

1.633

1

1.633

1.643

.202

.910

1

.910

.915

.340

.054

1

.054

.054

.816

186
194
193

.994

7
1

Mean
Square
1.243
4580.576

.672
2476.875

Sig.
.695
.000

1.081

1

1.081

.585

.445

.010

1

.010

.005

.943

2.030

1

2.030

1.098

.296

3.011

1

3.011

1.628

.204

.134

1

.134

.072

.788

1.927

1

1.927

1.042

.309

Error
184.942
Total
194.000
Corrected Total
192.680
a. R Squared = .040 (Adjusted R Squared = .004)

Dependent Variable:
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
ProsecutionMetaphors
DefenseMetaphors
DefendantRaceCondition
ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors
ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
QualityProsecution
Type III Sum of
Squares
8.704a
4580.576

df

F
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ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

.802

Error
343.977
Total
5044.000
Corrected Total
352.680
a. R Squared = .025 (Adjusted R Squared = -.012)

Dependent Variable:
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
ProsecutionMetaphors
DefenseMetaphors
DefendantRaceCondition
ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors
ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

ProsecutionMetaphors *
DefenseMetaphors *
DefendantRaceCondition

1

.802

186
194
193

1.849

.434

.511

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Confidence
Type III Sum of
Squares
22.328a
8018.343

7
1

Mean
Square
3.190
8018.343

.833
2094.174

Sig.
.561
.000

.141

1

.141

.037

.848

.057

1

.057

.015

.903

1.198

1

1.198

.313

.577

8.843

1

8.843

2.310

.130

5.665

1

5.665

1.480

.225

4.486

1

4.486

1.172

.280

.296

1

.296

.077

.781

186
194
193

3.829

Error
712.172
Total
8931.000
Corrected Total
734.500
a. R Squared = .030 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006)

df

F
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T-Test
Group Statistics

DefenseMetaphors
QualityDefense

N

Std.
Deviation

Mean

Std. Error Mean

nobullymetaphors

26

3.769

1.5049

.2951

bullymetaphor

20

5.450

.9987

.2233

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
For Equality

QualityDefense

Equal Variances
Assumed

F

Sig

3.837

.056

t-test for Equality

t

Equal variances
not assumed

Sig
(2Tail)

d

95%
Confidence
Interval

Std
Mean
Error of
DiffLower Upper
Diff
erence

-4.312

44.00

.000

1 680-

.3898

-4.541

43.192

.000

1 680-

.3701

2.4 .8952
2.4

-

.9345

*/ Whitedefendant
T-Test
Group Statistics

ProsecutionMetaphor
Quality Defense

N

nobeastmetioned

Mean

19

beastmetaphor

Std
Deviation
.

Std. Error
Mean

4.684

1.6681

.3828

4.510

1.5464

.2777
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Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
For Equality

QualityDefense

t-test for Equality

Sig
(2Tail)

Mean
Difference

Std
Error of
Lower Upper
Diff

.1681

.4642

F

Sig

t

Equal variances assumed .000

.985

.362

48.00

.719

.355

35.963

.724 .1681

Equal variances
not assumed

d

95%
Confidence
Interval

.4729

.7653 1.114
.7911

1.127
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